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This paper questions the common view that in the past half-century Australian 
women have radically changed their focus from unpaid domestic work to employed 
work. The common view is largely based on labour force participation rates. These 
rates give a deceptive picture. Actual work activity has to be tracked using figures 
on hours worked. This paper presents two sets of hourly figures from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, one set dating back to 1966, the other back to 1987. Neither 
suggests a dramatic change in women’s actual work activity. 
 
 
It has come to be almost universally regarded as an indisputable fact that women are 
moving out of the home and into the workforce. Economist Graeme Snooks sees it in this 
way: 
 
One of the central events of this period [Australia, 1940–1990] was the rush of female 
household workers to join the market workforce. This phenomenon ... constitutes 
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nothing less than an economic and social revolution — a revolution shared with the rest 
of the Western world.... (Snooks 1994: 142) 
 
Snooks’ view is widely shared. Women’s rapid entry into the workforce is regarded as an 
obvious fact, and not as a complex and debatable claim resting on contestable evidence. 
Yet in another way it has been perhaps the most ‘interpreted’ issue of our times. There are 
two levels here. On one level, the core of the issue has been treated as a simple matter of 
fact, but on another level the meaning of that supposed fact has been interpreted in 
multifarious ways. The interpreters all agree that it signifies fundamental changes — for 
good or ill, according to one’s preferred perspective — in the home, the workplace, the 
economy and ultimately in the shape of Australian society. This paper will argue for two 
contrary contentions: firstly, there has been no revolution in women’s work, and secondly, 
the attempt to find deeper significance in women’s work trends is misguided. 
 
The view I am contesting was well expressed in High Mackay’s Reinventing Australia: The 
Mind and Mood of Australia in the 90s. Mackay put women’s workforce involvement at the 
centre of his account of contemporary Australian life. For him, “There is no doubt about 
which of the redefinitions of the past 20 years [that is, 1970 to 1990] has had the most 
impact on the Australian way of life: it is the redefinition of gender roles which has taken 
place in the minds of roughly half the population — the female half”. Twenty years ago, he 
says, women were ‘second-class citizens’, reduced to acquiring “a kind of second-hand 
identity from the men they would marry”. Today, however, women say: “I am a person, 
entitled to the same sense of identity and the same status in our society as any other 
person”. This redefinition changes their view of everything — of men, romance, sex, 
marriage, parenting, family life, work, household management, and politics. And the key 
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symbolic change in women’s lives, the one that they chose as the “expression of their 
new-found definition of gender”, was paid work (Mackay 1993: 24-25). 
 
Mackay is not alone in this view. Graeme Snooks’ position on women’s entry into the 
workforce in the last half century is very similar to Mackay’s. For Snooks, there has been a 
revolution in women’s work, and its effects are far-reaching. He calls it “the greatest 
change in capitalist economies since the Industrial Revolution” (1994: 7). In consequence 
of the workforce change, birth rates and household size have fallen, marriage has become 
less necessary and divorce more common, family living standards have risen, and the 
demand for paid household services has risen with them. In general, family responsibilities 
have declined. Snooks differs from Mackay only — though importantly — in finding 




More recently, Anne Manne tells us that “We are in the midst of a social revolution: in 
women’s roles, and in the relations between the sexes. This revolution has had many 
consequences”. For her, the central contentious point in this revolution is “the increased 
employment of mothers of preschool children in many wealthy societies all over the world” 
(2006: 20).2
                                                          
1 Allon J. Uhlmann (2006: 20; see also 166-67) explicitly follows Snooks’s portrayal: ‘These two processes 
— the development of technology and the increase in service industry — brought about a major realignment 
in Australia’s political economy in the form of a rapid increase in active participation of married women in the 
labour market’. However, he notes that men continued to work longer hours than women. 
 Fiona Stanley, Sue Richardson and Margot Prior present a somewhat less 
dramatic picture of women and work, but they still regard women’s entry into the workforce 
as bringing about ‘a new world order’, one requiring consequent adaptive changes that are 
yet to be made. “How the workplace, and modern society generally, respond to this new 
2 Later, she is more cautious, seemingly questioning the evidence for a revolution in women’s work (2006: 
95-96). 
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What is the evidence for this supposed revolution? In Mackay’s popular account it is 
nothing more than a one-sentence summary of the labour force participation (LFP) 
statistics. “In 1970, 32 per cent of married women were in the workforce; by 1990, that 
figure had risen to 53 per cent of all married women and 60 per cent of all mothers with 
dependent children” (1993: 27). Snooks’ very academic discussion also rests its account 
of female workforce trends entirely on the labour force participation statistics (1994: 15-
17). In this, Snooks and Mackay speak for the common view, the only evidence for which 
rests on LFP rates.4
 
 This analysis is seriously inadequate, as I shall try to show. 
Workforce Participation and Workforce Activity 
There is no doubt that women’s labour force participation rates have changed dramatically 
over the past few decades, as Chart One shows. 
 
CHART ONE 
Labour force participation rates, 1964–2008 
(men, women, married women, aged 15 and over) 
<<insert chart one>> 
 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force, Australia (Cat. No. 6203.0), Labour Statistics, 
Australia (Cat. No. 6101.0), and Labour Force Status and Other Characteristics of Families, (Cat. No. 
                                                          
3 They note four other major social changes: population ageing through declining birth rates and increasing 
longevity; globalisation, corporatisation, and increasing competition in the economic sphere; increases in 
divorce and sole parenthood; and the rapid growth of technological consumption. 
4 Neither Manne nor Stanley et al offer any statistical support for their claims, yet they are clearly doing more 
than making rhetorical flourishes. Perhaps for them the claims have become taken-for-granted truisms. 
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6224.0); ABS (2000) Australian Social Trends 2000, (Cat. No. 4102.0); ABS (2007), Australian Social 
Trends 2007 (Cat. No. 4102.0). Some of these figures are also collected in R. Foster and S. Stewart, 
Australian Economic Statistics, 1949–50 to 1989–90, Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional Paper No. 8, 
1991; and Australian Economic Statistics, 1949–50 to 1995–96, Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional 
Paper No. 8, 1997, DOS Format Disk. 
 
In the past forty-five years, men’s labour force participation rate has fallen somewhat (from 
84 per cent to 72 per cent), but women’s has changed considerably, even radically. In 
1964, 33 per cent of all women aged 15 and over were in the workforce. Today the figure 
is 58 per cent. The trend has been steadily upwards. The trend for married women is 
similar, though steeper still — up from 25 per cent in 1964 to 59 per cent in 2003 (Foster 
and Stewart, 1991: 152; ABS, Cat. No. 6203.0; ABS, 2000: 28; ABS, 2007, Work, Table 
1.)5
 
 These figures seem like impressive evidence of change. We might even choose to call 
the change a revolution, and we might postulate a wide range of effects that could flow 
from this fundamental change. 
However, before we go further down this track, we need to focus on the core issue. 
Labour force participation rates tell us little, if anything, about actual time spent in paid 
work, yet they are commonly used as though they reflected a person’s real workforce 
involvement. On the standard Australian Bureau of Statistics’ definition of labour force 
participation, a person is deemed to be participating in the workforce if he or she has been 
in paid employment or has been looking for paid employment in the week before the 
labour force survey is taken. By that definition a person could move from non-participant 
to participant status simply by taking a few hours casual work each week or merely by 
deciding to look for work. We need to distinguish between workforce participation and 
                                                          
5 Regular LFP figures for married women have not been recorded since 2003. For a review of women’s LFP 
trends, see Evans and Kelley, 2004. 
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workforce activity. Workforce activity is a matter of the amount of work performed, and it 
can be measured by tracking hours worked each week. Luckily, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics publishes two sets of data relevant to this indicator. 
 
Firstly, there is ABS data on aggregate hours worked by men and women, in a series that 
goes back to 1966. In Chart Two aggregate hours worked is divided by the population of 
workforce age (15 to 64), to give an average hours worked per week by men and women. 
(It is assumed that very little of the aggregate figure is contributed by workers over age 
64.) I will refer to this as the ‘hours worked’ series. 
 
CHART TWO 
Women’s and men’s average weekly hours worked, 1966 to 2008 
<<insert chart two>> 
 
Sources: ABS, The Labour Force, Australia (Cat. No. 6203.0), Labour Statistics, Australia (Cat. No. 6101.0); 
also collected in Foster and Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics (1991) and Australian Economic 
Statistics (1997); ABS (2007), Australian Social Trends 2007 (Cat. No. 4102.0), Population, Table 1; Work, 
Table 1. 
 
Chart Two suggests that changes have been at least as marked for men as for women. In 
four decades, men’s average weekly hours worked have fallen from 38.6 to 31.6, whereas 
women’s have risen from 13.8 to 19.0. The convergence between the men’s and women’s 
trendlines is coming as much from the men’s trend as from the women’s. Women’s hours 
as a proportion of all hours worked have risen from 26 per cent to 38 per cent, but this is 
as much explained by the decline in men’s average hours as by the rise in women’s 
hours. The men’s trend has been level since 1982. The upward trend in women’s work 
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activity is steady but slow, growing at an overall rate of just over one hour per decade. 
More careful scrutiny shows that the trendline was flat from 1966 to 1982, and since then 
has been rising at a rate of 1.5 hours per decade. This rate would see women reaching 
men’s present work levels in about the year 2100. 
 
Our concern here is with the female side of this story. The labour force participation chart 
tells one story, the hours worked chart a much less dramatic one. In four decades since 
the mid-1960s, women’s LFP rate has almost doubled (up from 33 per cent to 58 per 
cent), while women’s hours worked have increased by about one-third (up from 13.8 hours 
per week to 19 hours per week). If we are measuring actual work activity, then the hours 
worked figures indicates that there has been no radical change of the sort supposed by 
Snooks, Mackay and others. 
 
Secondly, we have ABS time use studies, based upon diaries kept by large sample 
populations of persons aged 15 and over. Four such studies have been conducted by the 
ABS: in 1987 in Sydney; and in 1992, 1997, and 2006 Australia-wide (ABS, 1987; ABS, 
1993; ABS, 1998; ABS, 2008).6 Table One summarises the key evidence, comparing the 




Male and female paid work, average hours per week,  
                                                          
6 There is an earlier time use study from 1974, conducted by the Cities Commission in Melbourne and 
Albury-Wodonga. Its comparability with the ABS studies is questionable. See Cities Commission, n.d. 
7 The hours worked figures are consistently higher than the time use figures, but that is to be expected, as 
the former is based on persons aged 15 to 64, whereas the time use figures cover all persons aged 15 and 
over, thereby including those who are in retirement. The larger time use divisor produces a lower average 
figure. Another slight distortion will arise from increased longevity. In the mid-1960s, average male longevity 
was 69 years and average female longevity 75 years. In 1987 it was 74 and 79 years respectively; today it is 
79 and 84 years respectively. This increase will increase the time use divisor across time, and thus artificially 
reduce the average figure for paid work across time. However, the net effect of this distortion is small, 
depressing the 2006 figures by about 3 per cent. 
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1992 1997 2006 
Men TU 
 
30.9 28.5 27.4 28.7 
Men HW 
 
31.4 29.8 30.7 31.6 
Women TU 
 
14.7 13.4 13.8 14.1 
Women HW 
 




2.10 2.12 1.98 2.03 
HW Ratio 
M/F  
2.08 1.90 1.85 1.69 
 
 
Sources: ABS, The Labour Force, Australia (Cat. No. 6204.0) and Labour Statistics, Australia (Cat. No. 
6101.0), also collected in Foster and Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics (1991); ABS, Time Use Pilot 
Survey, Cat. No. 4111.1 (Sydney, 1988); ABS, How Australians Use Their Time, Cat. No. 4153.0 (Canberra, 
2008). Note: the time use figures include breaks and overtime but not time spent travelling to and from work. 
 
The time use figures for men show a very small downwards trend, at a time when the 
hours worked trend for men is flat. But for women the time use trend is flat, while the hours 
worked trend for the same period is slightly upwards. The ratio of male to female hours in 
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the two data sets is almost identical in 1987, but subsequently the ratios diverge, with the 
hours worked ratio steadily falling, while the time use ratio remain flat. The time use 
studies suggest that in the period 1987 to 2006 men performed about two-thirds of all paid 
work, and women one third. They indicate no rising trend in women’s work activity, and 
seem to leave no room for the revolutionary thesis. 
 
It might be thought that a generational change is taking place but that its presence is 
emerging only very slowly in the average figures. Ideally, we would want a cohort analysis 
to track such trends. The time use figures do include some age-related data. Table Two 
shows that younger women in the age range 25 to 54 work about two hours per week 
more than women ten years older than them. Amongst older women (55-64) employment 
activity has increased sharply.  
 
TABLE TWO 
Women’s paid hours per week by age group 
 
Age group 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
1992 17.8 18.4 19.5 19.3 6.5 
 1997 17.5 20.7 19.2 20.4 7.6 
2006 15.9 22.0 21.2 23.0 13.9 
 
Sources: ABS, How Australians Use Their Time, Cat. No. 4153.0, (Canberra, 1993), Table 15; ABS, How 
Australians Use Their Time, Cat. No. 4153.0, (Canberra, 1998), Table 29; How Australians Use Their Time, 
Cat. No. 4153.0 (Canberra, 2008), Table 7. 
 
Has There Been a Revolution in Women’s Work? 
 10 
This is some evidence of a generational trend, though the time span here is not great and 
the trend is not dramatic, except in the older age range. A careful cohort analysis of these 
figures would be useful, but that cannot be attempted here.8
 
 
Getting It Both Right and Wrong 
Overall, then, the ABS hours worked figures show a general upwards trend in women’s 
work activity, but the rise is slow and slight, while in the ABS time use figures the trend is 
flat. While commentators such as Mackay and Snooks have misconstrued the basic facts 
about women’s work trends, there are two studies that do get the core trends right. One is 
a 2002 public lecture by economist Bob Gregory, who observes that: 
 
Despite the rapid increase in education levels, despite large changes in social 
attitudes towards married women working in the labour market, despite large 
increases in labour market rewards and despite increased labour market 
involvement, the proportion of women 15 to 59 years employed full-time is much 
the same today as it was thirty-five years ago .... The overwhelming strategy has 
been to use part-time employment to add to the principal source of income which is 
delivered to women from a source outside their own full-time involvement in the 
labour market. (Gregory, 2002) 9
 
 
Gregory’s contention is correct, but it is based on figures for women’s full-time and part-
time work, and lacks any more fine-grained evidence of actual hours worked. 
 
                                                          
8 The 1987 figures classify age ranges differently, and cannot be used for comparison purposes, though 
presumably the original data could be reclassified. 
9 Gregory’s main point is noted in Manne 2006: 95. Figures showing the flat trend in women’s full-time work 
rates since 1971 had already been published in ABS, Social Indicators Number 5, Table 5.4, 205. 
Has There Been a Revolution in Women’s Work? 
 11 
Somewhat earlier, in 1994, economists Deborah Mitchell and Steve Dowrick set out the 
labour force participation and the hours worked trends for both men and women from 
1978 to 1993. They noted that LFP trends and hours worked trends (measured using the 
same sources as for Chart Two above) are ‘rather different’ for both men and women. On 
women’s work, they say that “Despite the large increase in the numbers of women 
participating in the labour force, their contribution to total hours is still only half that of 
men.” They note that in 1978 women aged 15-64 worked on average 14.2 hours per 
week, amounting to 29 per cent of all hours worked by men and women; in 1993 it was 
16.4 hours per week, equal to 35 per cent of all hours worked. That is, in fifteen years 
there had been rather little increase in women’s work activity. They then added: “In other 
words, the supply of labour by women outside the home is increasing but the potential 
supply is still substantially unused” (Mitchell and Dowrick, 1994: 4). 
 
Remarkably, despite this recognition of the small upwards trend in average hours worked, 
the remainder of their discussion is an attempt to explain why women’s labour supply has 
been increasing. In their view, three factors largely account for this increase: “the rapidly 
improving access of women to full secondary and tertiary education”, “decreased 
discrimination in both pay and employment”, and “shifting patterns of demand towards the 
service sector of the economy” (1994: 1). These factors may be good explanations, but 
what is being explained? In their account the key concept of ‘labour supply’ is left hanging 
ambiguously between participation and activity, but a moment’s reflection shows that 
supply cannot be equated with participation. If average hours worked falls then labour 
supply has fallen, even if participation has risen. And since in fact women’s average hours 
worked have risen at most only slightly, women’s labour supply has risen at most only 
slightly. Since the rise is at most a minor one, there is nothing much that needs 
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explanation. Discussion of education, discrimination and the services sector is 
unnecessary. Somehow Mitchell and Dowrick fail to see what is obvious from their own 
figures. It is a nice case of the way in which perspectives shape perceptions.10
 
 
Mitchell and Dowrick also offer no defence of their claim that women’s potential labour 
supply is still ‘substantially unused’. Given their evidence, that is obviously true, if they 
mean unused in the paid workforce, but it may be false if they mean unused simpliciter. 
Measuring use involves measuring capacity. Women may be doing other kinds of work, 
and they may be at or near the limits of their working capacity (given the general 
standards of their time and place). The time use studies shed light on this. Total work 
activity counts time spent in paid work, domestic work, childcare, voluntary work, 
education, and shopping. The first three studies (1987, 1992, 1997) showed a close 
equivalence between men’s and women’s total work activities. The 1997 study reported 
that “Men and women spent almost the same average amount of time on total work (425 
minutes and 432 minutes [per day] respectively)”, a difference of seven minutes per day 
more by women than by men (ABS, 1998: 7, and Table 1, 17). The 2006 study presents a 
different picture. It found that men average 526 minutes total work per day and women 
593 minutes, which adds up to about 8 hours more work per week by women (ABS, 2008: 
Table 4). Whichever of these stories is correct, overall women are not working less than 
men, so there are no grounds for thinking of them as relatively under-employed. 
 
Causal Stories 
The core facts, then, are not what they are commonly taken to be. The overall story is 
clear enough: a markedly higher percentage of women are in paid work, but average 
                                                          
10 Bettina Cass (2002: 144) follows Mitchell and Dowrick’s analysis of women’s rising LFP, though without 
remarking on their recognition that the trend in women’s hours worked has remained flat. 
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hours worked have risen slightly and slowly (on the hours worked figures) or hardly at all 
(on the time use figures). We can sum this up by saying that paid work has been 
distributed more broadly and evenly across the female population. Consequently, the task 
for economists and social scientists is not to explain what Snooks called “the rush of 
female household workers to join the market workforce”. Such a rush has occurred but it 
has added very little to women’s average paid work activity. Rather, the problem to be 
explained is why work activity has not increased strongly. This is a problem not because it 
is difficult to square rising participation rates with nearly flat activity rates — that presents 
no great difficulty. The problem is how to reconcile the low or nil rise in activity with the 
plausible reasons we have for expecting activity to have risen strongly. 
 
A number of hypotheses designed to explain a rise in women’s work have been already 
mentioned. Rising levels of education, growing demand for work in the services sector, 
decreased discrimination against women as workers, removal of legal barriers against 
women’s work, and the rise of feminist beliefs and attitudes will all — it seems reasonable 
to suppose — have tended to increase female work activity. Snooks makes a case for the 
claim that a strong postwar rise in the ratio of capital to labour has driven the labour 
market to seek out workers in the tertiary sector, where women have some comparative 
advantage over men (1994: 97-123). The steep decline in the birth rate must also have 
made work outside the home easier to combine with childcare responsibilities. Empirical 
support for at least some of these contentions is readily available. For example, a study by 
M.D.R. Evans (1988) showed the expected strongly positive correlation between, on the 
one hand, education and feminist orientation and, on the other, workforce participation. 
Evans showed also that the birth of children lowers workforce participation dramatically, 
from which we can assume that a drop in the birth rate would tend to raise work activity. 
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It would take us off the present track to attempt an evaluation of these various 
hypotheses. They may seem plausible enough. Yet the evidence of the present essay 
leaves us in the odd position of having good explanations for something that — if our 
focus is on work activity and not merely on workforce participation — has not happened to 
any marked degree. Faced with this, we can go in two very different ways. We can use the 
non-happening of the thing to be explained to discredit the would-be explanations; or we 
can accept the explanations as valid and postulate that some other factor or force must be 
operating to prevent the effect from following from the supposed cause. Neither move is 
particularly compelling. A good explanation remains a good explanation even if, on some 
particular occasion, it fails to be followed by the expected effect. Something might be 
blocking the usual mechanism. The sensible strategy is to look for the spanner in the 
works, and then, only when we are sure there is none to be found, give up the explanatory 
theory. 
 
In this case, however, there is no compelling theory about what might be doing the 
blocking. Legal barriers to women’s paid employment have fallen in the period. The only 
candidate that comes readily to mind is women’s rising relative wage rates. A rise in the 
female/male wage ratio will of course increase female labour supply but — arguably — it 
will lower employer demand. The rise has been a large one, increasing from 0.55 in the 
1930s to 0.93 in the 1970s, according to Snooks. He shows that it has stayed around that 
figure since that time (until 1990) (1994: 143; Table 8.16, 222). In his account of rising 
female labour market participation, Snooks constructed a regression model in which he 
tested the thesis that market participation might be a linear function of changing female 
wage rates relative to men’s, of changes in the birth rate, and of change in the 
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capital/labour ratio. Using data from 1946 to 1985, he found that, by itself, the 
capital/labour ratio could account for 98 per cent of the variation in female participation 
(1994: 88). This suggests that relative wage rates are a minor factor in LFP trends. 
Interesting though this is, the interest would be much greater if his analysis told us 
anything about work activity. Since LFP is very different from activity we cannot jump from 
Snooks’ finding to any conclusions about activity trends.11
 
 
One possible explanation of increases in women’s paid work is simply that women today 
have on average one or two children fewer than women a few decades ago. They 
therefore have more time on their hands, and part-time work fills that time quite nicely. 
This is a neat explanation except for the fact that it can be so easily reversed: it is equally 
possible that women have fewer children because they are working more.12
                                                          
11 For a more recent analysis of the literature on female labour supply, see Birch, 2005. She emphasises the 
complexity of the subject — no simple or single factor predominates in determining women’s labour supply. 
 But what if 
women are not working much more today than they were in the 1960s? The last four 
decades have been the era of the baby bust. The fertility rate has fallen from 3.5 children 
per woman in 1961 to 1.8 today (ABS, 1992: Table 2.3.1, 54, and ABS, 2007: 1.) Yet 
women’s average work activity is not much greater at the bottom of the baby bust than 
what it was at the height of the baby boom. Given this, then obviously the baby bust 
cannot be explained by increases in women’s paid work. The interesting issue is why 
increased work does not follow much more strongly from such a marked reduction in 
12 This is how Snooks argues. On his account, rising female wages and marked increases in demand for 
female labour explain the decline in the other sort of female labour. His economic model, he claims, can 
explain ‘99 per cent of the change in family size’ in the period 1946 to 1990. ‘Hence the first great change in 
the size of the Australian household in a century ... can be explained virtually entirely in terms of 
fundamental economic forces’ (1994: 68-69). 
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fertility. No obvious explanation comes to mind. The birth rate trends simply make the 
whole problem more puzzling.13
 
 
Indeed we seem to have not even the beginnings of a plausible theory to make sense of 
the actual trends in women’s work, largely because the actual trends have been 
misconstrued, owing to the failure to distinguish between participation and activity. 
 
Possible Consequences and Implications 
Interpretations abound of the meaning and ramifications of these supposed trends, 
focused mainly on questions of women’s identity and role and on secondary effects on the 
family. Hugh Mackay, for example, contends that the key change in recent Australian life 
is women’s redefinition of their social role, arising mainly from their new participation in the 
workforce. Other social phenomena — female fatigue, eating out, out-of-home childcare, 
talk of ‘quality time’ with children, tension between spouses over housework, high divorce 
rates, male backlash, etc — are presented as a by-product of this re-definition. As with 
Mackay, so with many others: the story of women’s entry into the paid workforce is no 
bare factual account. It is almost always told in such a way that it is made to seem 
charged with significance. The story centres on a core of supposed fact, which for many 
functions as an article of faith, one which tells us that the world really is moving forwards, 
and for others is a sign of decline, a movement away from the time-honoured order of the 
male provider and the female nurturer. 
 
                                                          
13 A further complicating possibility is that some of the small increase of women’s paid work hours is work 
that was previously done in the home. Housework has been to some degree commodified. What was once 
unpaid work is now low paid work. 
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Post-sixties feminism has taken a number of forms, but one thing the various feminisms 
have in common is the doctrine that paid work is personally beneficial. For women with 
children the main alternative to paid work is life as a homemaker and parent. Many 
feminists have thought that paid work is a good thing partly because it can be challenging 
and interesting, but equally because it frees women from homemaking and childcare. In 
the past, this story supposes, women’s talents have been dammed behind the wall of the 
family. Now the wall has been breached — by feminism, or technology, or market forces, 
or whatever — and those talents have been set free to energise the wider society. The 
story tends to leave family life in limbo, as a condition which has merely been left behind, 
when in reality many who accept the story also want family success of a fairly traditional 
sort. 
 
The story is nothing if not familiar. But consider its photographic negative, as told by the 
conservative social commentator, B.A. Santamaria. As he saw it, four main factors work 
against the health and strength of the modern family: the divorce revolution, as facilitated 
by the Family Law Act; the sexual revolution, as commercialised by Hollywood and 
television; the rise of radical feminism in the bureaucracies, the media and the universities; 
and “the industrialization of married women by their progressive absorption into the paid 
workforce” (1995: 8-9). Of these four he believed the last of these to be the most powerful. 
 
According to Santamaria, this absorption takes two forms: in one, a minority of educated 
professional women seek personal fulfilment in a career; in the other, a majority of working 
or lower middle class women are compelled into the workforce by the relative economic 
decline of families with children. In consequence of the second trend — not the first — 
“The strength of the family and its capacity to fulfil its various social functions rapidly broke 
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down under the strain….” (1995: 11). That second trend is a product not of women’s free 
choices but of market forces, forces let loose by governments, employers and economic 
theorists, who saw an opportunity to drive down the wages of male breadwinners by 
forcing them to compete with women workers.14
 
 Santamaria supports his account with 
evidence of economic polarisation, using taxable income figures said to show that the 
middle is being squeezed out by the rapid growth in the proportion of higher and lower 
income types. The failure, under pressure, of the modern family is evidenced by rising 
levels of divorce, sole parenthood, unemployment, youth suicide, and sexual abuse of 
children in non-standard family types. Behind his story lies an assumption about the 
importance of the ‘biological’ family. 
We have, then, two main story types, feminist and conservative, sharing a single account 
of the workforce trends and agreeing that those trends are hugely important, but seeing 
very different implications in them. It is easy to lose sight of their central assumption — 
that women have been undergoing progressive ‘industrialisation’. On the work activity 
evidence, both feminists and conservatives are arguing from a crucial false premise. 
Whatever gains or losses women have made or the family has incurred, none can be 
accounted for by the general work trends. The point can be generalised: there are no 
recent social changes, good or bad, which can be explained by a general growth in 
women’s paid work activity, for the simple reason that there has been very little such 
growth. 
 
Two commentators, Hugh Mackay and Anne Manne, combine elements of feminism and 
conservatism in interesting ways. Mackay’s position is far less black and white than the 
                                                          
14 On the central importance of market forces as drivers of workforce change, Santamaria (1995) and 
Snooks (1994) are in agreement; Uhlmann (2006), however, argues that there is a two-way interaction 
between market forces and the gendered structure of the household. 
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typical feminist and conservative accounts, but it turns on exactly the same axis. On his 
view the family is being redefined, in ways involving both gain and pain. This redefinition 
follows from women’s self-redefinition, but in a somewhat complex way: 
 
It is probably true that much of the present instability in Australian family life springs 
from changes in the role and status of women, but not in the simplistic way often 
assumed by those who try to forge a direct causal link between the working mother and 
the unstable family. The real connection is far more subtle than that: it has to do with 
the fact that women’s roles have become much less easy to define and, as a result, the 
transition from being a girl to becoming a mother appears to be a more demanding, 
more confusing, more complex and more painful transition than it was for previous 
generations of women. (1993: 65-66) 
 
Today’s grandmothers generally followed a single path: school, work, marriage, children, 
retirement. Then came what Mackay calls the “pioneering generation of working mothers” 
who broke this mould (1993: 47). Younger women today play multiple roles which “tend to 
diminish the relative significance of each one of those roles”. “They are so used to making 
choices — and to the idea of staying flexible — that the inflexible and irrevocable reality of 
parenthood comes as something of a shock”. This makes them “much more ambivalent 
about mothering and [much more] flexible about the nature of family life than their own 
mothers were” (1993: 67-68). 
 
Unfortunately, Mackay’s ‘pioneering generation’ is difficult to locate in the work activity 
evidence. No doubt there was a generation of women in the 1970s who pioneered new 
ways of thinking about work and its relation to personal identity. But Mackay’s account 
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requires widespread changes in work behaviour (the exercising of real choice), not just in 
ways of talking about work, if it is to explain family change or anything else. That evidence 
is lacking. 
 
Manne’s main concern in Motherhood is that the rise of women’s work has led to the loss 
of parental time with children, but she also places strong emphasis on the gains women 
have made in the workforce. Many who support the revolutionary thesis do so in part 
because they favour the liberation of women from the home. Others accept the thesis but, 
like Manne, worry that increases in women’s paid work are tending to take time and 
energy away from children’s nurture. Since the general trend for women’s paid work is 
rising only very slowly, this concern could be justified only if the trend for mothers work is 
quite different from that for women in general. The ABS hours worked data tell us nothing 
about the paid work of parents of dependent children, but the 1987, 1992 and 1997 time 
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Sources: ABS, Time Use Pilot Survey, Cat. No. 4111.1 (Sydney, 1988), Table 1.6; How Australians Use 
Their Time, Cat. No. 4153.0 (Canberra, 1993), Table 22; How Australians Use Their Time, Cat. No. 4153.0 
(Canberra, 1998), Table 10. The 2006 time use study does not include figures on married couples and sole 
parents. 
 
Here the twenty-year trend shows a small rise in married mothers’ hours worked, and a 
small fall in married fathers’ hours worked. In general married fathers do about three times 
as much paid work as their partners. Married mothers work about the same hours per 
week as the average for all women, while married fathers work much more than the 
average for all men (about 42 hours per week, compared with about 28 hours per week). 




The time use figures in Table Three — which is the best evidence we have — do suggest 
a weak tendency towards reduced maternal time with children. But two further factors 
need to be taken into account. Firstly, as already noted, the birth rate has fallen sharply in 
the post-1965 period, so increases in mothers’ paid work may simply be occupying time 
freed up by that fall. And, secondly, as Table Three shows, fathers’ time available for 
children has increased more than women’s time has decreased, so children today may 
enjoy a net increase in parental time compared with 1987. Looking as far back as the 
evidence will take us (1987), we can find no general trend showing children being cast 
aside by their work-obsessed parents. Once again, the revolutionary thesis — this time in 
its conservative version — is contradicted by the evidence.16
                                                          
15 Time use figures on sole fathers are available but are not likely to be reliable. 
 
16 The situation of children of sole parents may be different. In general, sole mothers have slightly fewer 
children than married mothers and tend to have a little less paid work, so they will normally have more time 




As this discussion has illustrated, social trends can be interpreted in diverse ways. There 
is a feminist interpretation and a conservative interpretation of women’s supposed work 
trends, and there are also hybrid interpretations such as those put forward by Mackay and 
Manne. And, of course, one cannot win any arguments about the merits of a trend merely 
by citing the trend — history may be progressing or it may be retrogressing. What is 
surprising is the remarkable consensus between proponents of quite opposed 
interpretations about the basic direction of the trends. Although two studies — those by 
Mitchell and Dowrick and by Gregory — have supplied good grounds to question the 
consensus, those studies have largely gone unheeded. 
 
Australia is fortunate in having good ABS figures on hours worked, going back to 1964, 
and, since 1987, good time use studies. This paper has attempted to bring this important 
evidence into focus. The main theses of the paper are, firstly, that female work patterns 
have changed much less in recent decades than is commonly thought, and, secondly, that 
since this is so, general trends in women’s work behaviour cannot be used to explain 
other social phenomena. It remains possible that significant changes are taking place in 
some sections of the female population (for example, amongst some professionals), even 
while the overall pattern is stable, but this has to be treated as no more than conjecture. 
New evidence will need to be brought forward before we can be confident of any such 
trends or effects. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
available to spend with their children. But of course the children of sole parents are likely to get less total 
parental time owing to the absence of a resident second parent. 
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The methodological moral of the story is that labour force participation figures are not a 
reliable guide to workplace trends. As Catherine Hakim put it back in 1993, the “headcount 
approach is not well suited to women’s work histories with long spells in permanent part-
time jobs, repeated movement in and out of the labour force, seasonal and casual work, 
and jobs taken as and when they are available” (1993: 108). Both popular belief and 
academic theory have generally assumed that economic change (structural adjustment, 
increased international competition, microeconomic reform, the rise of the services sector) 
and social change (women’s liberation from the home) impact on women’s work rates, and 
that LFP figures are a reliable index of this impact. These assumptions need to be 
questioned. The LFP rate is not a reliable index, and more reliable indicators show that 
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